What is private about our identity: against a substantialist approach
15 March 2018
The private v. public dichotomy is taken for granted in much of contemporary philosophical inquiry in ethics, as well as in the philosophy of mind and language. Interestingly enough, however, a lot of debates end up challenging the distinction. Take, for instance, the notion of private sphere, in Wittgenstein and Rorty.
Despite their different perspectives (one epistemological, the other ethical), they raise the same issues, e.g. the role of language and that of community in building our sense of identity; they even use similar metaphors, e.g. the “ornamental knob” in Wittgenstein and Rorty’s “orchids”; and they arrive at the same conclusion, with regard to the private: namely, that it is conditioned and shaped by the public. Does this lead to a somewhat diminished private sphere? Or on the contrary, is our self-identity enriched by its social roots and purpose?
I personally believe that in our current society the concept of private and public identity does not correspond to its original meaning. First of all, I believe we should find a common definition of what is identity. What are the factors that can be held responsible for shaping our personas?. When I think of identity I think of the definition of the true self. I would personally take into consideration values such as ethnicity, social class, political affiliation, religious beliefs, and sexual orientation. The issue is that all of these factors are so flexible; there are no such things as barriers that divide us into two or three categories. This is the moment when I believe our sense of identity stops existing between our private spheres, entering the labeled boxes of recognition that society needs to understand and accept an individual. Therefore I think it is safe to say that no matter how much we value our sense of privacy and personal truth, the moment we entered society as active members, we inevitably end up exposing our identities, purposely or not.
Anna,
you open up quite a few lines of enquiry here — all, equally important. One is about the meaning of the ‘true self’. This, as we shall see in a few weeks, is hardly an accepted assumption amongst philosophers. Some deny that there is such a thing as a true self; others define it in terms of memory, consciousness, or reasoning; whilst others see it as a ‘bundle of perceptions’, which is like a narrative (a story we tell ourselves) rather than any objective and consistent reality we could call ‘self’. We are far from achieving any kind of agreement on this.
Another line of reasoning you open up concerns the the values that define who we are — or the persona we project in the public arena.
Yet another topic is that of the relationship between the self and society; this raises the issue of recognition, acceptance, privacy etc.
Each of these lines are worth exploring at length. It would be good to acknowledge the difference between them, and try to develop one, maximum two, in a short text such as this one. Otherwise, you risk jumping from one thing to another, without clarifying any of them. But it’s good that your mind is open to so many alternative paths for exploration.